Analysis reveals how corruption adapts and pushes back against reforms in state-owned enterprises, indicating a need for stronger anti-corruption strategies.
Despite numerous anti-corruption mechanisms within the Zimbabwean State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), little can be ascertained about the manner in which corruption proactively resists and adapts to such interventions. While prior research focuses on prevalence and effect, few examine the dynamic, vengeful processes by which corruption forestalls reform. This study bridges this gap by analyzing the ways in which corruption "pushes back" in global, African, and Zimbabwean SOEs, analyzing strategies such as lawfare, political intrusion, propaganda, infiltration of anti-corruption agencies, and intimidation of whistleblowers. Drawing on qualitative content analysis of recent literature, the study identifies patterns and localized dynamics and concludes that corruption evolves in step with governance reforms and is inclined to employ state machinery and legal instruments to stall accountability. In Zimbabwe, these are further exacerbated by lack of institutional resilience, elite complicity, and limited international enforcement. The report emphasizes the need for adaptive anti-corruption, in the form of greater institutional insulation, regional and international legal cooperation, and immunity for reformers. The study contributes theoretically by shifting corruption as an actor, in practice by outlining resilient anti-corruption system design, and policy-wise by encouraging political will, effective legal systems, and civic empowerment in SOEs.
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Manyika et al. (2025) studied this question.
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