Qualitative analysis reveals how lobbyists build political credibility and influence in government, indicating significant implications for policy dynamics.
How do revolving-door lobbyists produce corporate political influence? The revolving door, or the circulation of personnel between government and lobbying, has garnered significant attention as an avenue for undue private influence over policymaking. In this article, the author argues that the revolving door is a mechanism through which individuals cultivate political credibility over time. Through 52 semistructured interviews with policy professionals involved in U.S. federal policymaking, the author illustrates three components of political credibility—credentials, bureaucratic competence, and claims to policy expertise—and how they are mobilized and constructed through career moves. Although revolving-door moves typically result in an accumulation of political credibility, career transitions also introduce opportunities for credibility depreciation. The findings highlight sources of inequality and heterogeneity among policy professionals and clarify the relational and cultural mechanisms through which corporations and interest groups exercise influence in U.S. politics.
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Wendy Y. Li (2025) studied this question.
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