This paper revisits the Simulation Theory (ST) as a framework for understanding human social cognition, challenging traditional ‘theory of mind’ or ‘folk psychology’ approaches. While these theory-based models posit that humans use an implicit body of knowledge to interpret and predict others’ behavior, ST emphasizes the use of mental simulation, leveraging the brain’s existing mechanisms for planning and prediction. By employing a predictive coding strategy, the brain minimizes cognitive load, interpreting others' actions through ‘inverse planning’ – a process that reuses one’s own action planning system to hypothesize the goals and intentions of others. The concept of agent-neutral coding is introduced, proposing that inputs for self and others are initially shared, reducing the need for explicit mental state attributions. This approach not only economizes cognitive resources but aligns with evolutionary perspectives on human social interaction in small, cohesive groups. In addition, the paper explores the role of perspective-taking and error correction in adapting shared mental representation. This reevaluation of ST underscores its efficiency and adaptability, offering a streamlined alternative to theory-based accounts of social cognition.
Robert M. Gordon (Mon,) studied this question.