Is Heidegger’s Account of Intentionality Inconsistent with Representationalism About Perception?

Currently, the consensus among interpreters of Heidegger is that Heidegger's account of intentionality in Being and Time and concurrent writings is inconsistent with the view that perception is a propositional attitude in which a perceiver stands in to abstract entities that mediate between a subject and its environment, a view I call representationalism. This paper argues that Heidegger's view of intentionality is inconsistent with representationalism only if Dasein's ontological constitution entails a non-representational relational conception of what Heidegger calls the 'as structure' of veridical perception, and that interpreting Heidegger's account in accordance with that condition is exegetically and philosophically problematic. I suggest that we adopt an alternative, metasemantic view, according to which Heidegger's account of perceptual intentionality explains what it means to experientially represent the world.