Meinongian Theories of Perception

Most assume that the bad cases of illusion and hallucination are not perceptions. What I call ‘Meinongian Theories of Perception’ disagree: in the good case, I stand in a relation to existing objects—Macbeth perceives the existing dagger—whilst in the bad case, I stand in a relation to non‐existent objects—Macbeth perceives the non‐existent dagger. My aim is to properly introduce Meinongian Theories of Perception, for they receive little notice in the literature. I distinguish between two versions of such theories, a psychological version, in which non‐existent objects are intentional, and an apsychological version, in which non‐existent objects are mind‐independent. I argue that the psychological version collapses into disjunctivism, whilst the apsychological version remains a live but underexplored option. The broader lesson learned is that the ontological status of what is perceived matters for theories of perception.