Case studies on Coral Sea and Midway highlight how aircraft carriers reshaped naval strategy, indicating a shift from traditional battleship doctrine.
U.S. naval doctrine prior to World War II envisioned decisive surface engagements led by battleships, reflecting the enduring influence of Mahanian theory and interwar fleet exercises. The attack on Pearl Harbor invalidated this model, forcing a rapid reorientation around aircraft carriers as the Navy’s principal offensive asset. Through case studies of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Guadalcanal campaign, this paper demonstrates that the rise of the fast carrier task force was not the result of prewar foresight but a response to operational necessity. Technological innovations such as the advent of more advanced radar systems alongside operational changes such as improved fighter direction and underway replenishment enabled this doctrinal shift and allowed carrier groups to project power across the Pacific. The resulting transformation redefined American maritime strategy and laid the foundation for postwar naval dominance. This article aims to trace that evolution and discuss how and why aircraft carriers became as central as they are today in naval strategy.
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Zaki George (2025) studied this question.
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