B a c k g r o u n d . Although Immanuel Kant was not a jurist, his philosophical legacy had a profound impact on the development of legal philosophy as a component of practical philosophy. His doctrine of law became part of the early modern discourse on the relationship between law and morality. The aim of the article is to clarify the place of the concept of law within Kant's system of practical philosophy and to analyze the key assumptions underlying his understanding of law. M e t h o d s . The study applies hermeneutic and conceptual analysis, along with historical-philosophical comparison and the comparative method. The primary sources include Kant's own works (especially The Metaphysics of Morals, Perpetual Peace, and his lecture courses) and modern interpretations, particularly by M. Willaschek, O. Höffe, and H.-G. Schmitz. Special attention is given to reconstructing Kant's definition of law and its components: externality, practicality, and universality. R e s u l t s . The study demonstrates that Kant's notion of law is normative rather than prescriptive. Kantian law is an external system of regulation grounded in the formal idea of freedom and allows for legitimate coercion. It is shown that Kant distinguishes clearly between law and morality by the criterion of internal motivation, introducing the concept of "law in the strict sense," free from ethical connotations. Particularly valuable are Kant's distinctions between moral and positive law, duties of right and duties of virtue, as well as legality and morality. M. Willaschek's interpretation emphasizes that Kantian law defines the limits of the permissible without prescribing moral conduc. C o n c l u s i o n s . Kant's doctrine of law is an original contribution to the theoretical foundations of normative order. It conceptualizes law as a framework for the coexistence of free wills governed by a universal principle. This approach remains relevant in contemporary conditions where the balance between legality and morality is of vital importance. Kant's distinction between law and morality does not imply separation but rather a rational complementarity, which represents a significant contribution to the philosophical understanding of legal order today.
Vitali Terletsky (Wed,) studied this question.