This review examines school autonomy and leadership measures in Chile, suggesting a paradox of centralization. Educational reforms aim to enhance principal responsibilities but often impose strict compliance.
Policymakers in Chile have focused on educational leadership since the mid-2000s, recognizing its importance for successful school reforms. This article reviews key structural reforms that promote school autonomy while simultaneously regulating public school leaders’ roles to align with policy goals, resulting in a centralization effect through institutional isomorphism. The discussion is divided into four sections as follows: the first addresses historical policies from the dictatorship that transferred public education responsibilities to municipal governments, fostering a quasi-market model; the second examines initiatives aimed at enhancing public school leadership, including defining principal’s responsibilities and strategies for attracting qualified leaders; and the third evaluates the New Public Education (NEP) reform, which reverts municipalization and introduces a new Directorate of Public Education, collaborating with the Ministry of Education to promote school autonomy within the Local Educational Services (SLEP). The fourth section analyzes policies for school leadership development. Despite the intention of enhancing autonomy, the article contends that autonomy is limited due to the pressures of policy alignment, leading to centralization through high-stakes performance assessments and performance contracts. Research shows that while principals may have some decision-making autonomy, it is often curtailed by the necessity to meet centrally defined targets and limited financial autonomy.
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Montecinos et al. (2025) studied this question.
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