Protecting Power System Infrastructure Against Disruptive Agents Considering Demand Response

Power system infrastructure is exposed to a range of threats, including both naturally occurring events and intentional attacks. Traditional vulnerability assessment models, typically based on the N-1 criterion, do not account for the intentionality of disruptive agents. This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to protecting power system infrastructure against deliberate attacks, taking into account the effects of demand response. The interaction between the disruptive agent and the system operator is modeled as a leader–follower Stackelberg game. The leader, positioned in the upper-level optimization problem, must decide which elements to render out of service, anticipating the reaction of the follower (the system operator), who occupies the lower-level problem. The Stackelberg game is reformulated as a bilevel optimization model and solved using a metaheuristic approach. To evaluate the applicability of the proposed method, a 24-bus test system was employed. The results demonstrate that integrating demand response significantly enhances system resilience, compelling the disruptive agent to adopt alternative attack strategies that lead to lower overall disruption. The proposed model serves as a valuable decision-support tool for system operators and planners seeking to improve the robustness and security of electrical networks against disruptive agents.