Unraveling Institutional Logics, Institutional Context and Perceived Corruption: Findings From Sub‐Saharan African MNE Subsidiaries

There is an evidenced scarcity of micro‐level research integrating perspectives on structure and agency to theorize how corruption manifests at an individual, organizational, and institutional level phenomenon. We address this gap by exploring qualitatively whether there is evidence of an overriding role of the institutional context over the institutional logic, evidence of conforming to conflicting institutional logics in the same organization, and evidence of the effect of bounded rationality, bounded reliability, and the MNE subsidiary institutional logics in tackling corruption. Data was collected conducting 42 semi‐structured interviews on 7 MNE subsidiaries from 7 distinct MNEs operating in four Sub‐Saharan African countries (Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria). Results reveal how deeply ingrained corruption makes strict compliance costly, how headquarters' enforcement of mandates is perceived as weak, and how short‐term performance pressures additionally complicate compliance. Our findings advance the literature on institutional logics via multiple contributions highlighted; Firstly, evidence of the overriding role of the Sub‐Saharan institutional context over the institutional logic. Secondly, evidence of the support behind the co‐existence of conflicting institutional logics in the MNE subsidiary. Finally, the effect of bounded rationality/reliability of MNE and subsidiary institutional logics in tackling corruption is highlighted.