Research on the Impact of Executive Promotion Incentive on Total Factor Productivity of Enterprises

With the continuous advancement of economic development, enterprises are progressively transitioning from an extensive growth model to an intensive development model, and the focus on corporate total factor productivity has become a prominent issue of the times. This study uses Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory and tournament theory as its main ideas, bringing together executive promotion incentives and corporate total factor productivity into one research framework. It further examines the mediating effects of analyst attention and innovation performance on the relationship between these two factors, as well as the moderating effect of corporate reputation. This study conducts an empirical analysis using a full sample of A-share listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China. The results show that executive promotion incentives exert a positive impact on corporate total factor productivity. Analyst attention and innovation performance play mediating roles in the relationship between executive promotion incentives and total factor productivity, while corporate reputation enhances the positive relationship between the two. This study provides empirical evidence and practical insights derived from real-world data, offering useful guidance for enterprises in determining whether to adopt executive promotion incentives as a means to improve total factor productivity.