A Stackelberg Game-Based Joint Clearing Model for Pumped Storage Participation in Multi-Tier Electricity Markets

To address the limited flexibility of pumped storage power stations (PSPSs) under hierarchical clearing of energy and ancillary service markets, this study proposes a joint clearing mechanism for multi-level electricity markets. A bi-level optimization model based on the Stackelberg game is developed to characterize the strategic interaction between PSPSs and the market operator. Simulation results on the IEEE 30-bus system demonstrate that the proposed mechanism captures the dynamics of nodal supply and demand, as well as time-varying network congestion. It guides PSPSs to operate more flexibly and economically. Additionally, the mechanism increases PSPS profitability, reduces system costs, and improves frequency regulation performance. This game-theoretic framework offers quantitative decision support for PSPS participation in multi-level spot markets and provides insights for optimal storage deployment and market mechanism improvement.