Analysis reveals board independence and nationality counteract earnings management in Moroccan firms, suggesting effective governance reforms.
Although many countries have implemented corporate governance reforms, empirical assessments of their effectiveness remain scarce, particularly in emerging economies like Morocco. This study aims to bridge this gap by examining the impact of Morocco’s 2008 Corporate Governance Code on earnings management practices among firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange over the period 2018–2022. Using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on a panel dataset of 34 firms, the findings reveal that board independence and the Moroccan nationality of the board chair are negatively and significantly associated with earnings management, suggesting their effectiveness in mitigating opportunistic financial reporting. Conversely, gender diversity and the frequency of board meetings are positively and significantly related to earnings manipulation, indicating that, under certain conditions, these governance attributes may inadvertently enable such behavior. Furthermore, board size shows a positive but statistically insignificant relationship, suggesting that increasing board membership does not necessarily curtail earnings management. Overall, this research provides new empirical evidence on the outcomes of governance reforms in Morocco and enriches the understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in emerging market contexts.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Chemmaa et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: