Application of Robert Jervis's Concept of Perception in the Study of Intelligence Activity

The fundamental role of the concept of perception in the development of theories of international relations, the study of intelligence, and warfare, as formulated by the prominent American political scientist Robert Jervis, is explored. The key tenets of his works are analyzed, particularly concerning the influence of cognitive processes, biases, and misinterpretations on decision-making by state leaders, the functioning of intelligence services, and the escalation of interstate conflicts. Special attention is paid to the application of Jervis's theory of perception to the analysis of specific historical cases, such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iraq War of 2003, highlighting systemic problems in the interaction between policymakers and intelligence. The impact of psychological and political factors on the formation of perceptions about the intentions and capabilities of other actors in the international arena is examined, as are the obstacles to the objective perception of intelligence information. Based on a synthesis of Jervis's works, the intractable dilemmas that arise in the process of intelligence activity and political decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and information asymmetry are identified. Cognitive traps that can lead to intelligence failures and erroneous political courses are also considered. The inevitability of a certain level of conflict between intelligence and policymakers, due to the different needs and missions of these two groups, as well as the difficulty of overcoming the inherent limitations of human perception in the context of international security, is emphasized.