The Politics of Institutionalization under Kim Jong Un: A Case Study of Constitutional Amendments in North Korea

This study analyzes the reasons behind the Kim Jong Un regime’s repeated constitutional amendments and interprets these changes as part of a strategic institutionalization process aimed at ensuring regime stability and consolidating political legitimacy. Unlike previous research that has focused primarily on the content of individual amendments, this study emphasizes the repetition and accumulation of six constitutional revisions, demonstrating how the North Korean regime has progressively structured its governing authority through institutional means. To achieve this, the study adopts an analytical framework combining Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change, March and Olsen’s new institutionalism, and Levitsky and Way’s theory of competitive authoritarianism to examine how constitutional amendments have served as instruments for political strategy, legitimacy reinforcement, and the concentration of power. The findings reveal that North Korea’s constitutional amendments are not isolated events but represent an ongoing, long-term process of institutional evolution driven by strategic objectives. By providing an integrated analysis of constitutional amendments from the perspective of strategic institutionalization, this study deepens theoretical and policy-level understanding of how institutions operate within North Korean politics.