ABSTRACT This article examines strategic force formation through cross‐national statistical analysis and a case study of North Korea's Strategic Rocket Force. Using mixed methods, we investigate how civilian control influences the establishment of specialized organizations for managing strategic weapons. Our analysis reveals that lower civilian control significantly increases the likelihood of separate strategic force formation. The North Korean case demonstrates that even in highly personalistic authoritarian regimes, periods of weakened civilian control—such as during leadership transitions—enable military organizational interests to shape strategic force development. Established in 2012 during Kim Jong‐un's succession, the Strategic Rocket Force illustrates how the military institutionalized its organizational interests, gaining enhanced resources, autonomy, and prestige. These findings complement explanations focusing on external threats or technological capabilities by demonstrating that military organizational interests and civil‐military dynamics also fundamentally shape strategic force development, with important implications for understanding nuclear proliferation and Korean Peninsula security.
Lee et al. (Fri,) studied this question.