Legal Militarization and the Transformation of Objective Civilian Control: A Comparative Study of Transitional Democracies

This research examines whether democratic erosion may occur not through military intervention but through legally sanctioned institutional integration. Building on Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control, it introduces the concept of legal militarization, defined as the expansion of coercive institutions into civilian governance through formal statutory authorization rather than extra-constitutional action. Using a structured, focused comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, and South Korea, the study analyzes how legally authorized appointments of active-duty officers reshape institutional boundaries and civilian oversight capacity. The findings show that legal militarization redistributes authority toward coercive actors and is associated with weaker civilian oversight where institutional safeguards are limited. However, strong constitutional review and bureaucratic autonomy moderate these effects. By specifying the conditions under which objective civilian control remains resilient or vulnerable, the article refines civil–military relations theory in transitional democracies.