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This study examines Turkey’s post-2016 civil-military restructuring through the distinction between military tutelage and democratic civilian oversight. Following the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, military education, command structures, jurisdiction, and internal security institutions were reorganized under closer civilian executive authority. These reforms curtailed military autonomy, but did not necessarily extend parliamentary, judicial, fiscal, and public scrutiny of the security sector. The article argues that Turkey’s transformation is better understood as executive-centred civilian control than as the consolidation of pluralistic democratic oversight. The case highlights the difference between subordinating the military to civilian rulers and making security governance democratically accountable.
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Polat Tunçer (2026) studied this question.
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