A public–private sector subsidy-investment Stackelberg game model for the green development of active distribution network

The green development of distribution networks has gained significant attention due to the integration of distributed variable renewable energy (VRE) and electric vehicles (EVs). This paper proposes a Stackelberg game model to analyze the strategic interactions between public subsidies, private investments, and technology costs in green distribution networks. Findings reveal that diversified subsidy allocation across distributed VRE, EVs, and storage enhances distributed VRE penetration by 20%, while optimized EV charging management improves public efficiency by 15%. Additionally, high battery storage costs create efficiency gaps between public and private sectors, highlighting the need for targeted subsidies to align interest. Cost-driven dynamics show diminishing returns of subsidies as technology costs decline, emphasizing the importance of adaptive scheduling tools and battery storage Research and Development (R&D).The study underscores the critical role of multi-sector subsidy portfolios and EV infrastructure investments in promoting sustainable energy systems. Additionally, key policy recommendations are given including prioritizing EV charging infrastructure, accelerating battery R&D, and integrating adaptive scheduling tools into regulatory frameworks.