Inherent constraints on imagistic imagination

Abstract A common and influential view sees imagistic imagining as an inherently free and unbounded type of thought that can nevertheless be subjected to epistemic constraints in individual instances. On this view, epistemic constraints can be imposed on imagistic imaginings to varying degrees, or not at all. The application of such constraints is said to allow imagination to serve as a route to knowledge, not just about the bounds of metaphysical possibility, but about quotidian contingent truths as well. This paper challenges that understanding of imagination by defending a new style of view where all imagistic imaginings occur under the same constraints and where these constraints are inherent within imagination itself. The argument relies in part on an analogy between imagistic imagination and image‐generating AI algorithms such as Midjourney and DALL‐E 3. On the inherent constraints view defended here, imaginings have the same positive epistemic value in all of their instances, with no need for willfully imposed constraints.