Efficient and Reliable Identification of Probabilistic Cloning Attacks in Large-Scale RFID Systems

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is widely applied in various scenarios, including logistics tracking, supply chain management, and target monitoring. In these contexts, the malicious cloning of legitimate tag information can lead to sensitive data leakage and disrupt the normal acquisition of tag information by readers, thereby threatening personal privacy and corporate security and incurring significant economic losses. Although some efforts have been made to detect cloning attacks, the presence of missing tags in RFID systems can obscure cloned ones, resulting in a significant reduction in identification efficiency and accuracy. To address these problems, we propose the block-based cloned tag identification (BCTI) protocol for identifying cloning attacks in the presence of missing tags. First, we introduce a block indicator to sort all tags systematically and design a block mechanism that enables tags to respond repeatedly within a block with minimal time overhead. Then, we design a superposition strategy to further reduce the number of verification times, thereby decreasing the execution overhead. Through an in-depth analysis of potential tag response patterns, we develop a precise method to identify cloning attacks and mitigate interference from missing tags in probabilistic cloning attack scenarios. Moreover, we perform parameter optimization of the BCTI protocol and validate its performance across diverse operational scenarios. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the BCTI protocol meets the required identification reliability threshold and achieves an average improvement of 24.01% in identification efficiency compared to state-of-the-art solutions.