Beyond the European Army Illusion: A Prudent Strategy for the Real European Zeitenwende

Geopolitics has forcefully re-arrived in Europe (Broeders et al., 2023; Farrell and Newman, 2023; Haroche, 2023). Take the return of large-scale territorial war in Ukraine (Bargués et al., 2023; Flockhart and Korosteleva, 2022; Johansson-Nogués and Leso, 2024) or the spreading trend towards economic de-risking and eventually de-globalisation (Bandemer et al. 2025; Herranz-Surrallés et al. 2024; Kornprobst and Paul, 2021). Policy-makers thus need to say goodbye to many 'taken-for-granted' notions that had socialised them into their professional careers. This imperative has acquired unprecedented urgency with President Trump's return to the White House in January 2025. His 'America First' doctrine, his explicit hostility towards multilateral institutions and his transactional approach to alliances have fundamentally transformed the transatlantic security landscape (Schütz and Mölling, 2025). The remarks of J.D. Vance, Trump's vice president, at the Munich Security Conference that European allies 'must play a bigger role in the future of this continent' and that 'America focuses on areas of the world that are in great danger' signal a withdrawal of America's strategic priorities away from Europe (Lu, 2025). Even before Trump 2.0, the diagnosis that the European Union's (EU) defence needs to be dramatically strengthened has been entrenched at both the member state and supranational levels. For example, French President Emanuel Macron had warned that Europe was 'mortal' and 'can die' (Le Monde, 2024). German Chancellor Scholz had declared that '[w]ithout security, everything else is nothing' and that Germany seeks 'to turn the Bundeswehr into Europe's strongest conventional force' in the coming years (Scholz, 2024). This is why '[g]lobal military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity' (Tian et al., 2023). At the supranational level, the perceived policy problem has been an environment of 'strategic competition and complex security threats' (European Union External Action, 2022), and the institutional solution has been to foster strategic autonomy (Fiott, 2022; Juncos and Vanhoonacker, 2024) and the gradual centralisation of military power into a 'European Defence Union' (Blockmans and Faleg, 2015) and, in the long term, a 'true European Army' (La Baum and Herzsenshorn, 2018; Samuel, 2022). The widespread perception that military capabilities are once again the sine qua non for survival as well as geopolitical influence has been growing. In other words, without your own military muscles, you become a rule-taker, rather than rule-maker, in world politics. While we agree with the diagnosis that more military capabilities will be helpful for the EU and its member states, we disagree with the policy advice of centralisation or even the need for a 'European Army'. In this policy commentary, we recommend a more viable alternative instead, which can also be more swiftly implemented in the face of Trump 2.0 and its existential challenges to the transatlantic partnership. Our argument involves three interrelated dimensions: First, we argue that the essence of the new geopolitics is not a hierarchy of policy instruments with military muscle at the top. Instead, EU policy-makers need to adapt to a geopolitical environment in which neither security always trumps markets, as in the Cold War, nor markets always trump security, as in the post-Cold War (Farrell and Newman, 2023). Today, the provision of security is a cross-cutting task (Kruck and Weiss, 2025). The key recommendation is therefore to better understand and, then, to exploit the mutual complementarity of military and economic assets. Second, we argue that the EU's quest for an institutional solution – namely, to centralise military power – is distracting at best and counterproductive at worst. While centralisation may seem naturally appealing to some, we argue that it faces insurmountable constraints, such as high sovereignty costs, while offering few benefits. What is the added value of centralised armed forces run by either fragmented or democratically unaccountable decision-making bodies? Instead, the EU should move forward where it has done best. It is an increasingly effective security manager with sophisticated regulatory expertise and innovative budgetary instruments (Kruck and Weiss, 2023). Rather than investing efforts into unviable illusions, we recommend that the EU matures as a dual security manager. It should maintain and strengthen its efforts to weaponise member states, for example, by regulating arms procurement or providing incentives to develop capabilities. At the same time, however, the EU should broaden its focus more on the challenge of coercing adversaries. Third, we therefore argue that the EU must abandon a second illusion: that effective geopolitical coercion is feasible without close North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coordination, even when NATO will face weakened commitment by the United States. The way forward is to shape and exploit the distinct strengths of the two organisations in order to create synergies that make them more effective than the sum of their parts would suggest. It might be late, but not too late, for such a Real European Zeitenwende. President Trump's return to the White House and his latent threat to suspend military aid to Ukraine has transformed this imperative from hypothetical to existential. As European security is facing its greatest challenge for decades – an increasingly aggressive Russia coupled with a reluctant or even hostile transatlantic partner – the EU's evolution into an effective dual security manager is no longer desirable but essential for European resilience and survival. This implies not only saying goodbye to a European Army but also designing a prudent and resilient division of labour with (the willing parts of) NATO. If this succeeds, the EU will become a weaponising power, helping member states to build up their military muscles and coercing adversaries through smart cooperation with complementary partners. To put forward this argument, we first outline how the EU has used its role as security manager to arm member states. Second, we draw on the recent EU–NATO coordination in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine to illustrate why and how a prudent division of labour is the way forward in the new geopolitical era – even under the condition of diminishing US contributions. Third, we discuss caveats, propose recommendations and conclude with policy priorities of how the EU should implement the Real European Zeitenwende in order to succeed as a weaponising power. The EU has for long leveraged (1) regulatory and (2) budgetary instruments to enhance the military power of member states. By contrast, centralising military capacities in the form of a European Army is neither necessary nor desirable (Genschel, 2022, p. 1897). Modern security is multifaceted, encompassing economic, technological and traditional military aspects. Aware of these complexities, we argue that the EU has effectively acted as a security manager by doing what it has done in other policy areas: it regulates the behaviour of member states and private companies (Kruck and Weiss, 2023). This strategy has recently been reinforced by new budgetary instruments to provide financial incentives for member states to engage in geopolitical coercion (notably the so-called European Peace Facility [EPF]) and to encourage member states to cooperate with each other (notably the European Defence Fund [EDF]). We argue that this indirect regulatory and budgetary approach is particularly well suited to help mitigate the weakest link problems prevalent in EU security issues. More precisely, we hold that acting as a security manager rather than as a direct security provider offers the EU several mechanisms to mitigate these problems: first, EU funding instruments like the EDF can provide targeted support to less capable member states, helping them develop specific military capabilities aligned with EU-wide priorities. Second, the EU's regulatory framework can set minimum standards for military capabilities across member states, ensuring a baseline level of competence. Third, the approach allows for flexible coalitions of willing states to move forward on key initiatives, preventing individual member states from blocking progress. Importantly, this strategy addresses the weakest link problems without full centralisation, as political control over military assets remains at the member state level. This flexibility allows the EU to enhance collective capabilities while respecting national sovereignty concerns and divergent strategic cultures. The EU has done a great deal to indirectly strengthen its member states through its extensive regulatory powers. It has shaped military innovation within its borders by setting incentives and standards for military equipment (Schilde, 2023). This regulatory power determines the type and quality of weapons produced, indirectly shaping member states' military capabilities (Fiott, 2024; Weiss and Blauberger, 2016). Most significantly, the EU has practised its role as a security manager in arms production (Weiss and Biermann, 2022). Prior to 2009, EU defence procurement focused on domestic producers, invoking the exemption provided under Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Consequently, governments rarely applied competitive tendering procedures as per EU procurement legislation (Directives 2004/17 EC and 2004/18/EC).1 The result was little competition and an extremely inefficient defence-technological base in Europe. By contrast, today, there is Directive 2009/81/EC,2 which all member states have transposed into national law, and that has introduced competitive tender instruments to increase efficiencies in Europe's defence-technological base. National procurement agencies can no longer favour domestic suppliers without justification. Article 346 TFEU exemption will be applicable only if European law compromises national security. This led to increased competition and efficiency in the EU's defence market. While the EU's economic strength is undeniable in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, it faces a notable weakness in high-tech sectors crucial for coercive power in the modern geopolitical landscape. This challenge, however, aligns well with the EU's role as a dual security manager. The EU can leverage its regulatory and investment approach to bolster high-tech capabilities across member states, thereby addressing this strategic vulnerability. For instance, within the EDF, there is a dedicated EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which explicitly 'supports actions that can help develop disruptive technologies based on concepts or ideas originating from "non-traditional defence's state-of-art" or emerging technologies equally disruptive contributing to the development of innovative defence systems' (European Commission, 2024a). By allocating resources to areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and advanced materials, the EU aims to close the high-tech gap and enhance its geopolitical position.3 These concerted efforts, we hold, gradually strengthen the bloc's position in critical high-tech sectors, turning a current weakness into a future source of geopolitical leverage. Moreover, the EU has also evolved as a regulatory expert to address more recent challenges, such as cybersecurity or military artificial intelligence (AI) (Bode and Huelss, 2023; Dunn Cavelty and Smeets, 2023; Hoeffler, 2023; Schilde, 2023). Yet the EU does not directly command and control these security domains. Instead, it does so very indirectly by setting and enforcing rules that guide the behaviour of member states and private firms (Biermann and Weiss, 2021). It is precisely in these areas that the EU should consolidate and expand its role as a security manager, as it will be of enormous help to member states in strengthening their military capabilities in the long term. Furthermore, the EU uses its budget to push member states to improve certain military capabilities. By strategically allocating money, it encourages member states to acquire weapons systems that are in line with the bloc's security objectives. This budgetary lever shapes and integrates the military landscape of member states. For example, the EDF uses the front door rather than the back door (i.e., regulation) of military innovation. This budgetary intervention in arms production can be considered a 'game changer'. From 2021 to 2027, the Commission will allocate almost €8 billion to European defence technology. One-third of this will go to joint defence research, two-thirds to joint capability development. The goal is to enhance defence technology cooperation among member states through coordination, not centralisation (Fiott, 2024; Hoeffler, 2023). In a similar vein, the '2023 EU Capability Development Priorities' promote 22 military capabilities to strengthen European armed forces for EU-wide defence planning (European Defence Agency, 2023). The modified EPF is arguably another game changer, initially for peacekeeping missions, now to support Ukraine's defence. The EU funded member states to transfer lethal weapons to conflict zones, with some shipments reimbursed through the EPF. With €11.1 billion allocated until 2024, the EU has used the EPF to directly reimburse member states for their provisions of military equipment to Ukraine, including lethal weapons (Maksak et al., 2023). This financing mechanism has enabled countries like Poland, Czech Republic and the Baltic states to transfer artillery systems, armoured vehicles and air defence systems to Ukraine without bearing the full financial burden, demonstrating how the EU effectively leverages its budgetary instruments to coordinate and incentivise member states' security contributions while respecting their sovereignty in military matters (European Council, 2024b). While most capabilities can be developed through such an indirect approach, we acknowledge that some critical areas like European air defence or satellite launch capabilities may require more centralised coordination. However, we hold that the EU – acting as a security manager rather than the owner and operator of these capabilities – significantly facilitates coordination without full military centralisation, for instance, through joint procurement and technological development of air defences by coalitions of the willing. Only recently have such initiatives materialised, when in November 2024, the Commission approved €300 million in funding for five joint defence procurement projects under the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (Ruitenberg, 2024). Two of these projects focus on air and missile defence systems, the MISTRAL project, involving nine member states (France, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Denmark), for the procurement of very short-range air defence systems and the JAMIE (Joint Air Missile Defence Initiative in Europe) project, involving six member states (Germany, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Austria, Estonia and Latvia), for the procurement of IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defence systems (European Commission, 2024b). Yet we admit that a security manager that reinforces member states' military efforts may not be fully sufficient to meet all of today's geopolitical challenges. However, if centralising military capabilities is not the solution either, the question of how the EU can exert influence on the world stage arises. Unlike those that see the EU as 'alarmed' (The Economist, 2022) as well as 'ill-equipped' to manage today's geopolitical turbulences and crises (Schramm, 2020), we argue that the essence of the new geopolitics is to smartly combine economic and military assets. If the EU lacks its own military capabilities for coercive action on the world stage but is extremely strong in economic assets, it should look for partners with similar political objectives but complementary assets. NATO remains the most suitable candidate even under the condition of shrinking US commitments. We therefore recommend that the EU should advance from a one-dimensional manager into a dual security manager. It should join forces with (the willing parts of) NATO to weaponise geopolitical rivals. Such a policy recommendation does not need to be formulated as a counterfactual scenario, but the recent EU–NATO division of labour to coerce Russia after 2022 might provide a blueprint for such a Real European Zeitenwende. As a multipurpose international organisation (IO), the EU interacts with other IOs across various issue areas, often with overlapping memberships and complementary capacities. Under the condition of regime complexity (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Biermann and Daßler, 2024; Daßler, 2022, 2024; Gehring and Faude, 2014; Morin and Orsini, 2013; Randall Henning and Pratt, 2023), it has numerous opportunities to amplify its influence by partnering with other IOs (Daßler et al., 2024a; Hoeffler and Hofmann, 2024; Hofmann, 2011; Panke and Stapel, 2023). And, in turn, the EU is a highly attractive cooperation partner for other IOs as it brings autonomous economic power to the table that helps to weaponise relations with adversaries. Its capacity to effectively coordinate economic sanctions represents a powerful supplementary means that other actors may wish to draw on (Meissner, 2023). Hence, the EU is capable of influencing target states' behaviour through coordinated economic measures, utilising the collective economic power of member states without military involvement. Sanctions supplement other actors' military actions, broadening the EU's impact. This approach more than offsets internal supply deficits. While the effects of sanctions are often contested and may not always achieve full policy alignment, they remain a powerful tool in the EU's geopolitical arsenal. For instance, not only have sanctions against Iran proven relatively effective in bringing the country to the negotiating table over its nuclear programme (Seeberg, 2016), but also Russia is struggling today: 'Signs that the official data masks severe economic strains brought on by both war and sanctions have become increasingly apparent. No matter how many workers it tries to shift to the defence industry, the Kremlin cannot expand production fast enough to replace weapons at the rate they are being lost on the battlefield' (DeVore and Mertens, 2024). The EU is thus able to compensate for economic capacities that other IOs lack, whereby it reinforces joint coercive efforts (Daßler et al., 2024a). Since February 2022, the EU and NATO have efficiently coordinated their unique capabilities to strengthen Ukraine and weaken Russia, expanding the EU's role as a dual security manager. They signed a joint declaration on 10 January 2023, condemning Russia's aggression against Ukraine and expressing unwavering support for Ukraine, while outlining a shared vision for future actions (European Council 2023). Both IOs have further developed the coordination of Ukraine-related projects. For instance, the EU's participation in donor coordination on cybersecurity, organised by NATO, reflects a highly coordinated effort where the EU provides financial and technical support while NATO focuses on adding value by its security skills. The shared objective is to create synergies in strengthening Ukraine's cyber defences (NATO, 2023, p. 10). Moreover, both IO bureaucracies have continued to coordinate their research and innovation policies, such as the EUDIS, the EU Defence Innovation Hub (HEDI), the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund, to ensure mutual awareness of policy developments in this issue area: 'the EU and NATO are playing complementary, coherent and mutually-reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security' (NATO, 2023, p. 1). Their approach has mutually supplemented each other by an almost functional division of labour. On the one hand, the EU leveraged its economic power stemming from its common market and has imposed a series of sanctions designed to weaken Russia's economic strength by depriving it of critical technologies and to undermine its ability to wage war (European Council, 2024a). In addition, the EU has also drawn on its budgetary instruments by increasing the ceiling of the EPF by another €5 billion, totalling €11.1 billion by 2024 (European Council, 2024b). On the other hand, NATO leveraged its military expertise to complement the EU's sanctions and financial aid to Ukraine. Since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, NATO and Allies have been providing unprecedented levels of direct military support to Ukraine (NATO, 2024a). This support has included various lethal weapons with a specific focus on air defence, ammunition, and long-range strike capabilities (Mills, 2024). Yet what if the United States – suddenly or gradually – withdraws from NATO's commitments? With President Trump's suspension of military aid to Ukraine in March 2025 (Liptak et al., 2025), we argue that the EU needs to develop a dual-track capability development strategy that increases its autonomy while not abandoning complementarities with NATO (see also Schütz and Mölling, 2025). We propose that the EU should prioritise investing in three specific domains: (1) advanced integrated air and missile defence systems that protect European territory while contributing to NATO's eastern flank protection; (2) cyber defence and electronic warfare capabilities that address shared vulnerabilities yet can be deployed independently; and (3) strategic mobility infrastructure that serves both NATO reinforcement plans and potential EU-only operations (see also the EU's action plan on military mobility, European Commission 2022). This prioritisation would enable the EU to leverage its financial instruments – like the EDF and proposed €150 billion in defence loans – to strengthen member states' capabilities in ways that serve both collective defence within NATO and provide meaningful independent options should US disengagement continue. The ongoing development of projects like the MISTRAL and JAMIE air defence initiatives demonstrates the viability of such an approach, as these systems simultaneously bolster NATO's integrated air defence while providing member states with autonomous defence capabilities (see, e.g., Muravksa, 2023). We contend that the EU will also be able to implement a dual-track capability development strategy by focusing on non-specific, redeployable military assets (Weiss, 2012). It should apply three sets of priorities: first, by focusing on modular systems with interoperable components that can function within NATO frameworks, yet operate independently, if needed; second, by prioritising European industrial development in these sectors to reduce supply chain dependencies; and, third, by establishing capability-sharing arrangements that maintain national sovereignty over deployment decisions while enabling collective action. Such a balanced approach would ensure that strengthening European (redeployable) contributions to NATO enhances, rather than diminishes, EU member states' strategic autonomy – precisely because these capabilities are designed with both integrated and independent operations in mind. The dramatic shift of US policy – after 3 years of sustained military support for Ukraine – has not only created an immediate test case for the EU's capacity as a dual security manager but has also triggered a feedback effect to better help arm member states. The European Commission's swift response with the announcement of an €800 billion 'REARM Europe' plan appears to be an important step into this direction, demonstrating the EU's evolving capability to respond to external security challenges through internal budgetary and regulatory mechanisms (Schmitz 2025). This five-point plan – which includes activating fiscal escape clauses to allow increased defence spending, proposing €150 billion in loans for joint procurement and mobilising private capital – exemplifies how the EU can leverage its economic strength to fill gaps created by shifting US priorities (Henley, 2025). These unprecedented steps show that the EU has become aware of both the imperative and the unique opportunity to evolve a dual security manager in real time, rather than remaining distracted by subscribing to the illusion to become another sovereign security monopolist. In sum, the EU and NATO responded to Russia's aggression since 2022 by supplying those capacities to the joint coercive efforts that the other one lacked. This division of labour created synergies and thus increased Russian costs of sustaining its war efforts against Ukraine. Rather than fantasising about a future European Army, the EU should thus draw the lesson from these emergency actions that the Real European Zeitenwende will be accomplished when it further succeeds improving its capacity as a dual security manager. This policy commentary departed from the notion that the new geopolitics has been constituted by the blurring – rather than the separation – of economics and security (Farrell and Newman, 2023). The higher the capacity to exploit economic interdependencies and deploy coercive instruments for political ends (Wigell and Vihma, 2016), the better will the EU perform as a geopolitical actor in the future. Unlike widespread reflexes, however, we hold that there is no need for a centralised European military force. Instead, we argue that the EU has – internally – emerged as a successful security manager that uses regulatory and budgetary instruments to enhance the military power of its member states. Yet there is more to the EU's geopolitical arsenal. While many policy-makers still cling to the idea of a European Army independent of NATO, we rejected it as an unviable and undesirable policy option. We thus suggested that the EU should – externally – further exploit complementarities with other IOs, in general, and NATO, in particular. This remains valid, even if the United States withdraws from its European commitments. Coordination with other IOs will provide great opportunities to create significant synergies through a functional division of labour. If the EU thus succeeds to act as a dual security manager combining economic and security instruments at multiple levels, it will exert significant influence in the geopolitical arena by its manifold opportunities to weaponise relations with other actors. This will be the Real European Zeitenwende. Despite this optimistic outlook, two caveats need to be spelled out. First, the return of Donald Trump to the presidency and his March 2025 decision to freeze military aid to Ukraine has transformed uncertainty into concrete reality, challenging the division of labour between NATO and the EU. However, this development may ultimately strengthen rather than weaken the argument for the functional coordination that we advocate. The dramatic public confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, where Trump accused Ukraine of 'gambling with World War III', signals a fundamental shift in US policy that necessitates a more robust European response and an opportunity for the EU member states to take over the leading role within NATO – with or without a reluctant United States. The EU has already demonstrated its economic leverage through continued sanctions against Russia and the Commission's proposed €800 billion defence investment plan. Combined with NATO's established military infrastructures and expertise, this approach still produces a combined effect that exceeds individual contributions and has the potential for efficient and quick rearmament of EU member states. As European Commission President von der Leyen stated, 'We are in an era of rearmament' (quoted in Brzozowski, 2025) – a recognition that the EU must accelerate its evolution as a dual security manager to compensate for potential voids in US leadership. Thus, taking over a leading role within NATO could help mitigate the impact of potential US withdrawal, which is now looming even larger with upcoming Trump 2.0 (Daßler et al., 2024b). By enhancing national military capacities and promoting interoperability among European forces, an indirect weaponising strategy ensures that the EU evolves as a credible security actor even in the absence of US support. Such a decentralised and indirect approach allows for greater adaptability to emerging threats while fostering a more equitable distribution of defence responsibilities among member states. Second, the question on whether the EU's increased weaponising efforts will ultimately cannibalise its global influence as a normative power arises (Manners, 2002). We contend that this is not necessarily the case. Instead, the EU's soft power can also complement its economic and security capabilities. Take the United States as an example. Its power of attraction has sometimes been limited by its capacity to use force, but it has often been enhanced by it (Nye, 1990). In a similar vein, the EU can actually strengthen its normative influence by increasing the credibility of its stance on global issues. This approach allows it to maintain its unique position as a values-based actor while adapting to the realities of power politics. For example, a more capable EU could more effectively promote human rights and democratic values by backing up its diplomatic efforts with credible economic and security measures. As a result, however, European strategists need to think more about the challenge of double standards than about a European Army. Prudence will be required as policy-makers balance the EU's weaponising efforts with its traditional role as a benevolent actor. This balance is essential to preserve the EU's distinctive appeal and influence, particularly in regions where its soft power has been a key asset. If the EU succeeds in meeting these challenges, we propose two additional policy priorities that will bring it closer to becoming an effective dual security manager in geopolitics. First, the EU should establish new and ramp up existing strategic investment initiatives focused on strengthening the economic and technological capabilities of member states in critical sectors rather than investing to duplicate military structures that already exist at national levels. By fostering the collective capacity of economically and technologically strong member states, the EU can project significant coercive power without the need for a centralised military force. These investments should prioritise areas of both economic and geopolitical importance, such as advanced manufacturing of strategic goods with potential military applications (e.g., semiconductors and cyber technologies). They should also target member states' renewable energy infrastructure to reduce dependence on foreign sources. Such 'smart investment' initiatives ultimately empower member states while strengthening the EU's collective coercive capabilities, which will consolidate its position as a major player in the multipolar world. Institutionally, a defence commissioner could play a crucial role in this process. This position, which emerged from the 2024 elections, will not resemble a traditional defence minister but rather a dual security manager, orchestrating the EU's indirect means of geopolitical influence. This commissioner will bridge the gap between security and economic interests, ensuring a coherent and effective response to the rise of the new geopolitics. Second, the EU should prioritise deepening institutional cooperation with NATO – with or without a hesitant United States! – instead of trying to duplicate some of its military infrastructures. While the coordination and cooperation between the two IOs has made remarkable progress since February 2022 (NATO, 2024b), future EU policy should focus on establishing a permanent forum for enhancing and expanding the functional division of labour between the two IOs. One area where there are both a great need and a great opportunity to institutionalise EU–NATO cooperation is securing cyberspace. While both IOs have been coordinating their efforts to enhance cybersecurity since 2022 (NATO, 2022), these initiatives have hardly been institutionalised but could be an excellent tool for developing a unified response strategy to large-scale cyberattacks, where interdependencies and thus economies of scale across all members of both organisations are high. What is ultimately new in the age of geopolitics is that coercive strategies rooted in simplistic 'container' thinking are destined to fail. Military means may continuously achieve military ends; and economic means may still serve first and foremost economic ends, but political objectives – such as imposing our Clausewitzian will on Russia – require a sophisticated combination of both. For the EU, this is more of an opportunity than a threat. In order to act as a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker, it should build on its strengths rather than being distracted by its inherent weaknesses. Realising its great potential as a dual security manager hinges on combining military and economic assets smartly. And, here, the EU is well equipped to transform its arsenal and to emancipate itself as a geopolitical powerhouse – the key objective of the Real European Zeitenwende. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.