The proliferation of microgrids and the rapid electrification of transportation have intensified competition for distribution‐level resources, highlighting the need for effective coordination strategies for energy sharing and electric vehicle (EV) charging. This study aims to tackle the complexities of optimizing EV charging within an energy‐sharing market, where multiple microgrids engage in electricity trading and compete for flexible demand. We develop a robust game‐theoretic framework that incorporates two critical components: a generalized Nash equilibrium game model and a nested Stackelberg game. The Nash equilibrium model captures the interdependent bidding behaviors of microgrids, while the Stackelberg game treats EV users as price‐sensitive followers, who adjust their charging strategies based on station‐specific tariffs and travel costs. The two models are integrated into a bilevel generalized Nash–Stackelberg formulation that holistically represents the strategic interactions among all stakeholders. To solve this coupled equilibrium, we utilize a fixed‐point scheme embedded in a modified best‐response algorithm, ensuring convergence to the joint solution of the inner Nash game and the outer Stackelberg game. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed strategy effectively guides EV users toward economically rational charging patterns, balances utilization across charging stations, and enhances overall network efficiency and microgrid profitability compared to conventional decentralized scheduling methods. These results underline the practical value of the framework for integrated management of transportation and power infrastructures.
Zheng et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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