This article reveals the role of shock in cognition, linking affect and subjectivity in Deleuze's semiotics.
The article offers a new interpretation of the notion of shock in Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, with respect to his conception of the sign and semiotics. My perspective is based on the presupposition that shock is the condition of experience and knowledge, and that it is an operative concept that runs through Deleuze’s entire work. Deleuze argues against the idea that humans have a natural tendency to think – on the contrary, thinking occurs in a situation of violence when something forces us to think. I then move on to an account of the relation between sign, cognition and shock, focusing in particular on how Deleuze connects the notion of shock to affect: this connection is present in Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, and also appears in his books on the cinematic image. Affect becomes an important link between the formation of subjectivity, the experience of the world and the transformation of thought. There is no shock without affect, and there is no affect that does not presuppose shock.
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Martin Charvát (2025) studied this question.
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