The article examines the evolution of scientific views on the nature of conflict of interest in public administration. The historical origins of the problem are considered, starting with the works of Aristotle, who distinguished between governance for the common good and that which serves the private interests of rulers. The further development of the concept is traced within the framework of social contract theory (J. Locke), which substantiated the accountability of power, and M. Weber’s concept of rational bureaucracy, which emphasized the separation of official duties from personal interests as the foundation of professional ethics. The institutional approach to studying conflicts of interest (D. North, O. Williamson) has been examined, as well as the principal-agent theory (M. Jensen, W. Meckling), which allowed for the conceptualization of conflicts of interest as a manifestation of the agency problem. The significance of the ethical approach (D. Thompson) has been revealed, focusing on moral responsibility and the principle of democratic accountability. It is determined that conflict of interest is a legal situation consisting of a contradiction between the private interest of a person authorized to perform public functions and their official duties, which creates a potential or actual threat to the objectivity and impartiality of management decisions. The content of private interest is revealed as any property or non-property benefit for the person themselves or persons associated with them. The main elements of the structure of this phenomenon are outlined: subjective (person with powers and private interest), objective (specific circumstances or decisions), and functional (possibility of using official position). The peculiarities of interpretation of the concept in Ukrainian legislation are analyzed, particularly in the Law of Ukraine «On Prevention of Corruption,» which contains the concepts of «potential» and «actual» conflict of interest, but does not contain a clear definition of the term itself, which complicates law enforcement. Contemporary scientific approaches to studying conflict of interest and corruption risks are analyzed. Integrated models are considered, particularly R. Klitgaard’s corruption formula, which clearly demonstrates the connection between monopoly, discretionary powers, and accountability. S. Rose-Ackerman’s research on the impact of political competition and institutional independence on conflict of interest control is highlighted. The main approaches to understanding the nature of the phenomenon are systematized: structural-functional (conflict as system dysfunction), behavioral (study of individual motives), and systemic (analysis of multiple factor interaction). It is emphasized that effective regulation of conflict of interest requires comprehensive application of legal, ethical, and institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability and integrity in the public sector.
Kostromina et al. (Thu,) studied this question.