Between hubris and eros: Rethinking punishment in Plato’s dialogues

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the concept of punishment in Plato, with regard to the conception of transgression as excess (hubris). Hubris throws the soul out of a harmonized order, thereby also disrupting the harmony of the social order. Within this framework, punishment functions as a means by which the soul of the individual, and society as a whole, is returned to its original state of harmony, that is, justice (dikaiosyne; ??????????). According to The Republic, every injustice is necessarily tied to excess, which emerges when the soul?s non-rational parts fail to fully subordinate themselves to reason. However, in the dialogue Phaedrus, Plato introduces a more nuanced understanding of the parts of the soul and their interrelations. This introduces alternative possibilities for achieving harmony among them, calling into question the injustice that supposedly accompanies every form of ?excess.? In this light, punishment can no longer be merely a means of ?healing? the soul of the offender. By drawing attention to passages from The Laws and Phaedrus that cannot be easily reconciled with Plato?s earlier views on the nature and role of punishment as presented in The Republic, the paper demonstrates why, in Plato?s thought, it remains problematic-and perhaps ultimately untenable-to formally ground the concept of punishment.