What mens rea for ecocide in the Rome Statute?

Amidst the pressing global climate crisis, there is a growing momentum to adopt ecocide as a fifth crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). One major challenge in this endeavour lies in the enduring definitional issues associated with ecocide, and notably with the mental element of this crime. This paper explores the crucial question of how the mental element of ecocide should be conceptualised if this crime were incorporated into the ICC Rome Statute. As a starting point, it considers the general rule on mens rea established in Article 30, which encompasses both direct and indirect intent. It is argued that both these standards fail to effectively encapsulate the most serious environmentally destructive acts, including those stemming from corporate resource exploitation. This paper thus advocates for ecocide's mens rea to derogate from Article 30's general rule. By interpreting Article 30 in its context, this paper argues that there exist at least three permissible derogations to this rule, namely: negligence, recklessness, and wilful blindness. It is argued that the IEP was right in considering recklessness as the preferable option to frame the mental element of ecocide, and that wilful blindness can serve as a viable alternative.