Navigating the Waters of Emotion with a View Toward Cooperation

What emotions are is a central question in the science of emotion. It is often interpreted as a question about how one should define the theoretical term “emotion.” It is also often interpreted as an invitation to understand the nature of emotions. In this paper, I demonstrate how these two interpretations can be related through an interdisciplinary, pluralist approach to the science of emotion. In doing so, I illustrate the limits of Klaus R. Scherer’s proposed consensual, polythetic working definition with respect to some fundamental concerns in the science of emotion. I use the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion to argue that once psychological theories of emotion are more clearly delineated along two fundamental concerns—the metaphysical and the meta-semantic—one can trace the logical implications of these fundamental concerns to their implications on the design of empirical research and more clearly understand that the pursuit of knowledge in the science of emotion requires a cooperative effort between those who take emotions to be stars, as well as those who take it to be constellations.