This study uses the geopolitical lens of Halford Mackinder to examine 18th century Balkan conflicts, arguing that the Habsburg-Ottoman and Russo-Ottoman wars, although seemingly fought over territorial expansion, were fundamentally struggles for control of the Danube’s Black Sea outlet—a strategically important area for Austrian strategists like Count Luigi Marsigli for example. The analysis reveals a geopolitical trichotomy. Alongside Britain’s maritime empire and Russia’s emerging land empire, Austria pursued a “fluvial empire” model, establishing the Danube as an axis of power. However, this strategy proved unsustainable. Although Austria resisted Russian advances in the Danube Delta, forcing St. Petersburg to shift its expansion eastwards into Central Europe, it ultimately succumbed to British economic pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean and abandoned its broader ambitions. By the Napoleonic era, the “fluvial empire” strategy had faded, thus cementing the 19th century “Sea vs. Land Empire” dichotomy. Due to economic and technological limitations, the Danube could not be exploited to achieve global dominance, rendering the term “Danubian Monarchy” merely symbolic of a once-powerful Habsburg empire. Thus, 18th century geopolitics are best understood as a time of transition, during which the power of rivers briefly rivaled that of maritime and continental models, before ultimately succumbing to structural constraints.
Ivan Parvev (Sun,) studied this question.