Three Peoples, One State? Constitutional Design, Ethnic Identity, and Governance Challenges in Bosnia

This paper analyzes the structural challenges of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stemming from its consociational constitutional design adopted through the 1995 Dayton Agreement. While the system recognizes three “constituent peoples” (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), it has institutionalized ethnic divisions and weakened the effectiveness of governance. The political framework, though internationally supported, has proved financially burdensome and functionally inefficient. Entities like Republika Srpska and HDZ-BH have actively challenged the authority of the central government, eroding state legitimacy. The central scientific finding of the article is that the imbalance between ethnic identity and constitutional structure intensifies political fragmentation and paralyzes institutions. The novelty of this research lies in its comprehensive analysis of the constitutional initiatives and political crises between 2021 and 2025. The core hypothesis posits that the model of “Three Peoples- One State” cannot sustain itself without inclusive and renewed constitutional reforms that go beyond ethnic power-sharing.