Partial agreements as a mechanism of legal adaptation to new challenges: sanctions, energy crisis and technological competition

This study examines partial agreements as a mechanism for legal adaptation to rapid modern challenges like international sanctions, energy crises, and technological competition, areas where traditional international law struggles. Partial agreements are arrangements among selected participants (states or other subjects), not necessarily all parties, allowing consensus on specific urgent problems. They enable cooperation without full unanimity, acting as flexible tools combining voluntariness and speed to fill legal gaps and support international legal order amidst fragmented interests. The paper analyzes examples of their application across these fields: in sanctions, coalitions coordinate joint actions (e.g., G7+EU oil price cap) and selective deals (e.g., US-Venezuela, Black Sea Grain Initiative) allow dynamic regime adjustments; in energy crises, they facilitate rapid resource/risk redistribution and adaptation through bilateral solidarity deals (within EU), agreements with external suppliers (e.g., EU-Norway, USA), and partial regulatory mechanisms (Ukraine’s grid synchronization being an example); in technological competition, partial deals among allies (e.g., US-Japan-NL export controls) and sectoral agreements (e.g., US-China trade deal) address regulatory gaps, and alliances (e.g., Clean Network, US-EU TTC) harmonize rules or set standards (Ukraine’s participation is also noted). These agreements are linked to geopolitics and economic interests, act as «legal laboratories», and risk fragmentation, but are necessary for adaptation. In conclusion, partial agreements are effective adaptation tools filling vacuums, potentially serving as pilot projects for broader norms. International law needs to integrate them, viewing them not as a threat to unity but as an evolutionary path in the 21st century.