ABSTRACT This study examines how mayors' personal wealth affects social spending in South Korean local governments, utilizing panel data from 17 regional and 226 municipal governments (2009–2022). Drawing on public choice theory and elite theory, it investigates whether mayors' wealth influences social spending decisions and if this effect persists within political parties. The analysis uses fixed effects models to reveal that wealthier conservative mayors reduce welfare spending while increasing healthcare expenditures, suggesting strategic fiscal allocation driven by personal economic interests. In contrast, wealthier progressive mayors increase education spending, viewing it as a politically viable alternative to direct redistribution. These findings show that even within the same political party, mayors' social spending preferences vary systematically with their financial standing. The study contributes to understanding how personal wealth shapes local governance and suggests policy reforms to enhance democratic accountability in budget allocation. Related Articles Ayhan, Kadir Jun, and Nancy Snow. 2021. “Introduction to the Special Issue: Global Korea Scholarship: Empirical Evaluation of a Non‐Western Scholarship Program from a Public Diplomacy Perspective.” Politics & Policy 49(6): 1282–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12440 . Heo, Inhye. 2013. “The Political Economy of Policy Gridlock in South Korea: The Case of the Lee Myung‐bak Government's Green Growth Policy.” Politics & Policy 41(4): 509–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12029 . Kane, John, Hui‐Chieh Loy, and Haig Patapan. 2010. “Introduction to the Special Issue: The Search for Legitimacy in Asia.” Politics & Policy 38(3): 381–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00240.x .
Moonsoo Lee (Fri,) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: