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This analysis reveals variations in arithmetic truths within set theory models, suggesting implications for truth determinateness.
We prove that the satisfaction relation N φ [ a] of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure N and the formulas φ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic N,+,· ,0,1, < , yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same Hω ₂,∈ or the same rank-initial segment V_δ ,∈ , yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures. On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure N=\\,0,1,2,… \,\ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.
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Hamkins et al. (2025) studied this question.
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