This analysis identifies key differences in national standards for automated vehicles, highlighting potential trade barriers due to TBT.
As automated driving technology emerges at the center of global technological hegemony competition, differences in national standards are acting as critical Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In particular, China, Korea’s largest trading partner, has increased TBT risks by building an independent automated vehicle standards ecosystem based on government-led industrial policies. This study aims to derive effective policy implications by quantitatively comparing and analyzing the consistency between Korean Industrial Standards (KS) and China’s Guobiao standards (GB) for automated vehicles, with a focus on their relationship with international standards. For this purpose, official policy documents and data released by authoritative institutions in both countries were collected to construct an analytical dataset of key national standards in the field of automated vehicles. Based on this dataset, the study compared and analyzed the distribution of standards by technical domain, their legal characteristics, and the degree of adoption of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards—classified as identical adoption, modified adoption, or self-developed. The results reveal a stark contrast between the two countries’ standardization strategies. Korea pursues global compatibility through an “open harmonization” strategy, with an identical adoption rate of international standards reaching 69.2%. In contrast, China relies heavily on “strategic autonomy,” with 72.7% of its standards being self-developed and none being identical adoptions. This striking difference demonstrates China’s clear orientation toward positioning standardization as a core driver of its national innovation system, and suggests that potential TBT risks may materialize for Korea and other trading partners. Accordingly, this study proposes the following policy recommendations: the establishment of a national-level monitoring system for Chinese standards, the development of international standard leadership strategies in Korea’s areas of strength, the reinforcement of Korea-China standardization cooperation channels, and enhancing the flexibility of domestic standards policy.
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Son et al. (2025) studied this question.
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