Synapse
⌘+K
Synapse
PulseExploreClubsResearchersJournals
Instagram
HomeClubsExplore
October 1, 2025Scientific ReportsOpen Access

A stochastic evolutionary game of boosting urban low-carbon development in China

View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Authors

RCRongjiang CaiELEdmund HoiNgan LoiXWXi Wang

Discussion

Loading...

Member takes

Overview

This analysis reveals strategies for enhancing government subsidy and public participation in low-carbon urban development amid environmental uncertainty.

Key Points

  • Active public participation can replace some government regulation, encouraging low-carbon initiatives.
  • Government subsidies can discourage participation when set excessively high, highlighting the need for optimized structures.
  • Enterprise behavior shows high sensitivity to social losses, motivating low-carbon solutions when these losses are minimized.
  • Public engagement is most influenced by compensation mechanisms from enterprises, emphasizing the need for alignment.

Cite This Study

Cai et al. (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68dd89e6fe798ba2fc4980fdhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-06698-z
View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Transition in the Steel Industry Under Demand-Side Constraints: A Simulation Based on Empirical Data2026
  2. 2Research on Environmental Pollution Control Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game in China’s New-Type Urbanization2024 · 1 citations
  3. 3Tripartite Evolutionary Game for Carbon Reduction in Highway Service Areas: Evidence from Xinjiang, China2025
  4. 4Spontaneous Formation of Evolutionary Game Strategies for Long-Term Carbon Emission Reduction Based on Low-Carbon Trading Mechanism2024 · 22 citations
  5. 5Can energy saving and emission reduction policies promote green transformation of industrial enterprises——The Case of China2024 · 3 citations