Ֆրանսիայի արտաքին քաղաքականության փոփոխությունների ազդեցությունը Հարավային Կովկասի անվտանգային ճարտարապետության ձևավորման վրա / The impact of changes in France’s foreign policy on the configuration of the South Caucasus security architecture

Introduction Recent changes in France’s foreign policy priorities have a significant impact on the formation of the South Caucasus regional security system. France has historically maintained active political and economic cooperation with the South Caucasus states; however, the region has not featured prominently among the strategic priorities of its foreign policy agenda. Our study is aimed at the assessment of recent changes in France’s foreign policy, and its impact in the South Caucasus. So as to elucidate what role France geopolitically plays in ensuring security in the South Caucasus, the article has evaluated the specifics of France's military-political and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The current changes in France’s foreign policy priorities Reviewing the priorities in France’s foreign and security policy began back in 2017 during Macron’s presidency, which was imputable to the tendencies in the rise of the instability in the European security system and that of the threats to the national security. The spread of Islamic extremism in Europe, terrorist threats, the Ukrainian crisis, the cooperation problems in the period of Trump’s first presidency, as well as the EU’s economic and migration issues generated new threats in the European region, which, in turn, provided a framework for Macron’s administration to review the national security and foreign policy priorities. In 2017, France published the Defence and National Security Strategic Review, which declared combating terrorism, overcoming the crises in the Sahel and the Middle East, as well as enhancing European strategic autonomy as foreign policy priorities1. The fight against terrorism in France was pursued through a tough policy towards Islamic extremism and control of migration flows. To overcome the regional crises, the operations “Chamal” (Opération Chammal) in Iraq and Syria, “Barkhane” (Opération Barkhane) in the Sahel region were carried out, as well as a significant presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was maintained. And the enhancement of the strategic autonomy of the EU required a policy of supporting the integration of states into it by creating an independent European defense system. The next review of France's foreign policy priorities was done in 2022. The launch of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict, the intensification of competition for dividing the spheres of influence in different regions, the competition in sci-tech superiority and innovation or the "technological arms race", and the transformations in international transport and energy lines of communications built France the bedrock to once again review its foreign and security policy priorities. With the publication of the 2022 National Strategic Review, France redirected its strategic focus from counterterrorism and the fight against extremism toward preparing for high-intensity interstate conflicts in the Mediterranean and European regions. The review emphasizes the need to counter hybrid threats, address the intensifying rivalry among great powers, and enhance the effectiveness of strategic deterrence mechanisms. Changes in France's strategic interests are also displayed in the Middle East. In 2022, France, within the framework of Operation “Chamal”, was already prioritizing not increasing direct military involvement in regional conflicts, but rather deepening cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish Self-Defense Forces, Iraqi Armed Forces, and Peshmerga fighting against the Islamic State2. However, the French military deployments, still maintained in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, no longer play a key role in establishing regional security and stability in strategic terms. Building the EU’s strategic autonomy is one of the important directions of French foreign policy. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, the growth of US-China contradictions, in addition to Trump's presidency in the US, further increase the threats to the European security complex, thus making room for the need to enhance the EU's strategic autonomy. Within the framework of the establishment of a polycentric world order, France seeks to embrace the EU’s transformation from being an “object to a subject” of security provision, notably, to establish a European security system independent of NATO. This implies conducting a policy independent of the US, China, and Russia, establishing France's pan-European leadership in the EU, and increasing cooperation with other geopolitical powers in the sphere of common interests. In this context, the article also discusses the activation of France's policy of increasing the volume of military equipment exports and promoting joint production after the Russia-Ukraine war3. Trump’s policy may greatly affect the formation of the EU's strategic autonomy. Changes in the political course of the US current administration create new opportunities for France to unite European states around the idea of ​​building a new pan-European security system independent of the US. France has expressed particular concern over instances in which certain members of the U.S. administration are perceived to interfere in the domestic electoral processes of specific EU member states and to provide implicit or explicit support to right-wing extremist movements within Europe4. The fact that France's strategic documents define the goal of becoming a “driving force” (capacité d'entraînement) in the region, and a “balancing power” (puissance d'équilibre) globally as one of the main priorities of its foreign policy, also indicate the abovementioned5. The strategy of becoming a “driving force” ensues from Macron's European defense doctrine, which implies complementing NATO's territorial defense role in the European region, establishing a common military intervention force, a common defense budget, and developing a shared military doctrine for action6. As for the aspirations to become a “balancing power”, they are often perceived as an attempt to maintain equal distance from both sides in the US-PRC strategic rivalry. The Indo-Pacific direction is also in the shortlist of France's foreign policy priorities. This region is important not only because it is regarded as a novel powerhouse of global economic growth, but also because the majority of its naval bases are deployed there7. The Mediterranean ­ Red Sea – Arabian Sea – Indian Ocean – the Pacific route is the main itinerary for French naval supplies. Concurrently, France openly supports the implementation of two important projects that bypass Turkey: the “EastMed” pipeline construction project to transport gas discovered in the Israeli sector of the Mediterranean Sea, and the creation of the “India – Saudi Arabia – Jordan – Israel – Greece” economic corridor. The role of France in the South Caucasus changing security environment In terms of changing world order and growth of polycentricity, the balance of power formerly established in the South Caucasus is gradually being reshaped. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, France is in a somewhat pursuit of furthering its engagement in the fragile regional security system. France's national strategic review does not anticipate any provisions on cooperation with either the South Caucasus, or individual regional states, only the section on European security priorities brings up the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The section on the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP), where Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have received particular mention, it states that France should contribute to their stability and the implementation of structural reforms by vitalizing mechanisms for its economic aid and European programs8. Since France does not have a comprehensive regional strategy for the South Caucasus, unlike the Balkan, Indo-Pacific, and Central Asian regions9, it is of critical importance to understand in which broader security complex France has embraced the South Caucasus region. As per the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are included in the section on the European region10. And what’s more, in official publications there are no strategic statements referring to the three states simultaneously. As we have mentioned, the only statement highlighting the commonalities of the South Caucasus is the EU's policy of supporting the Eastern Partnership initiative. In this context, the statement in the document closely mirrors the provisions outlined in the European Union’s defense strategy known as the "Strategic Compass"11.Therefore, it can be concluded that France’s regional foreign and security policy aligns with the provisions of the "Strategic Compass", adopted in 2022 during the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Complementing the EU’s strategic approaches, France, after the launch of the Russia-Ukraine War, began enhancing its engagement in the process of the settlement of the South Caucasus regional issues. This is primarily due to the review of France's foreign policy strategic priorities in 2022. Increasing regional involvement in the South Caucasus does not imply that a new strategic direction of foreign policy is being set up, as is the case with the African, Middle Eastern, or Central Asian regions, but rather that the region is by and large considered a sub-area at the intersection of the expanded Middle Eastern, European, and Central Asian regions. For France, the weight on the South Caucasus is significantly increasing in the context of the implementation of its foreign policy goal of establishing European strategic autonomy and the application of restraints towards Russia. Simultaneously, the crisis in military-political relations between Armenia and Russia, as well as the increasing role of Azerbaijani energy and transport channels connecting Central Asia to Europe and bypassing Russia open up new opportunities for France. The role of the South Caucasus is no longer limited merely to the prospects of EU cooperation with regional states. Notably, Azerbaijan is primarily perceived in the context of the Central Asian, and Georgia and Armenia – in that of the expanded Black Sea security complex. Furthermore, given that Turkey's growing influence in the Middle East poses obstacles for France to strengthen its strategic positions, the latter may also attach certain importance to cooperation with Armenian Christian community-based organizations in the Middle East. On account of strategic reviews in French foreign policy priorities, and enlargement of energy involvement in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, France takes some interest in unblocking the lines of communications in the South Caucasus as well. New possibilities arise for increasing the French energy influence in the Caspian region. Therefore, confiding the control over the lines of communications passing via Armenia to Russian forces is fraught with significantly limiting the possibilities of enlarging France’s involvement in the Caspian region. It is in France's interests that regional lines of communications be completely unblocked, whereas the sovereignty of regional states is preserved, without the establishment of either Russian or Turkish control. And this is possible only if the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan is ensured. France – Azerbaijan: economic and political relations and prospects for their development Political and economic relations between France and Azerbaijan have developed in an atmosphere of partnership. France is the second state after Turkey to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev made their first foreign visits to France during their terms of office. Moreover, back in 1993, an agreement on friendship was signed between the two states, which significantly developed bilateral economic, energy, cultural and educational ties. The defense sphere also saw development of relations between France and Azerbaijan. According to the 2020 Report to Parliament on France’s arms export, in 2010–2019, France sold €148.4 million worth of ammunition to Azerbaijan12. Although no details about the types of ammunition are known, however, there have been subsequent publications in various media platforms. In the appendix to the “Azeri Defense”, which is considered one of the unofficial sources of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, it is stated that France has supplied Azerbaijan with “Aster 30 Samp/T” and “VL MICA” missile systems13. According to other open sources, the Azerbaijani armed forces also have French-produced “MO-120-RT-61” grenade launchers and a certain consignment of “Sherpa 2” armored vehicles14. In the defense sphere, Azerbaijan cooperates with the French company “Airbus Defence and Space”, through which the Spot 7 optical Earth-imaging satellite was sold to “Azercosmos” in 2014. The same company also built a satellite control center in Azerbaijan and undertook training Azerbaijani specialists15. 60% of the share of France's economic ties with the South Caucasus belongs to Azerbaijan. In 2023, France – Azerbaijan trade circulation doubled as per in 2022, amounting to $423 million. Exports from Azerbaijan to France amounted to $130 million, more than 90% of which were oil products16. The French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) is actively involved in the development of the Azerbaijani economy, providing financial, technical and advisory support to Azerbaijan in the modernization of its lines of communications. In 2015, the AFD provided financial aid with the amount of €112.5 million for the renovation of the Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railway line. And in 2018, the Agency allocated €93.5 million for the modernization of the Sumgait – Yalama section of the North – South railway network17. As the French Ambassador to Azerbaijan declared, the AFD was ready to provide up to €5 million worth financial aid to Azerbaijan for the modernization of transport, water, and energy infrastructures. The ambassador's statement also highlights France's support for Azerbaijan's sustainable development, including potential economic activities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this context, it is noteworthy that in 2021, the French ambassador to Azerbaijan stated that there was no obstacle, political or any other, to French businesses operating in the territories recently “recovered” by Azerbaijan18. The cooperation between France and Azerbaijan features the energy sector as well. The French oil and gas company “TotalEnergies” has nearly 30 years of experience in cooperation with Azerbaijan. It owns 35% stake in the Absheron gas and condensate field and holds 5% stake in the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. In 2023, the company signed Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation with the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan for the development of 250 MW solar and 250 MW wind power plant projects. “TotalEnergies” is cooperating with the Azerbaijani SOCAR in the ongoing monitoring of methane emissions. The French company also takes interest in financing the Azerbaijani educational system, to be exact, in 2023 alone it provided $400 thousand worth scholarships to Azerbaijani students19. For France, the development of economic relations with Azerbaijan gains great importance in terms of maintaining cooperation with the Central Asian states. France puts a high value on the stability of these states, as it gradually increases its economic involvement in this region. In terms of France’s energy security, cooperation namely with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which account for about half of the share of world's uranium production, whereas 60% of electricity generation in France is provided by nuclear power plants, is of utmost significance. Due to the decrease in influence in Africa, France was bound to stop its uranium import from Niger, which had provided 20% of France's uranium needs over the past ten years20. As for importing uranium from Russia, here, too, France is devoid of any possibilities of using the port of St. Petersburg. Therefore, during Macron's visit in 2023, a strategically important declaration of cooperation in the sphere of strategic minerals was signed with Kazakhstan21. Presently, more than 170 French companies operate in Kazakhstan, including French state-owned companies in electricity and nuclear production, and “TotalEnergies”. In the field of oil refining France also actively cooperates with Turkmenistan in the region22. To conclude, we can assert that the blockade of the West – Russia lines of communications, the sanctions against Russia and Iran significantly underscore for France the import of uranium and other energy resources from the Central Asian region via the port of Baku. In case the economic relations with Azerbaijan deteriorate, France may jeopardize maintaining its strategic involvement in the region of Central Asia. In terms of the enhancement of economic cooperation between France and Azerbaijan the bilateral political relations notably suffered after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Any emergence of political discrepancies between France and Azerbaijan has always been stipulated by cases of aid rendered to Armenia from various political forces in France. But as long as France was still factually considered an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair state, its government was unable to lend any unconditional political support to Armenia in the course of the negotiation processes on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The French government has always been considerate about the support policy for Armenia, mindful of being thrust out of the mediation processes. On the one hand, Macron’s administration didn’t want to be accused by the French political forces of withholding support to Armenia, and on the other – didn’t want that very support to be perceived by Azerbaijan as cessation of mediation and an urge to become a party to the conflict. With this very logic, in November 2020, the French Senate called for the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh independence, whilst the French government refrained from any concrete action. During the mediation activities of the OSCE Minsk Group, political discrepancies between France and Azerbaijan did not grow into a political crisis. The period of the actual cessation of French mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution negotiation processes, which went down in 2023, after the Azerbaijani-imposed ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, can be considered the outset of the political crisis between France and Azerbaijan. At that time, Macron accused Azerbaijan of attacking the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and called for a discussion of their rights and security issues23. Moreover, France began to initiate discussions on the security issues of the Nagorno-Karabakh people in the UN Security Council and in various EU structures, which, needless to say, encountered strong criticism from Azerbaijan. Following these events, various Azerbaijani officials began to make harsh accusations directed at France, holding it responsible in the pursuit of an anti-Azerbaijani policy. Azerbaijan also began to use this French policy in a domestic political context. In order to preserve its power, and then smoothly transmit it, the Aliyev regime, tried to incorporate new “hostile characters” so as to consolidate the Azerbaijani society. In this framework, during the scheduled presidential elections in February 2024, the growing Western influence in the region and the activation of foreign forces to interfere in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs were presented as threats against Azerbaijan24. In return for France's approches to politically support Armenia, Azerbaijan took up to certain actions against French citizens. In December 2023, Azerbaijani authorities arrested French citizen Martin Ryan on charges of espionage, and in April 2024, they arrested Frenchman Théo Clerc on charges of property damage in the Baku metro. These arrests further strained relations between France and Azerbaijan. The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France condemned these arrests and urged its citizens to refrain from traveling to Azerbaijan in view of the danger of arbitrary arrests and unfair trials25. The political tension between France and Azerbaijan even rose more because of the Azerbaijani-instigated disturbances in the French Pacific island of New Caledonia. In April 2024, the Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament signed a cooperation agreement with pro-liberation forces in New Caledonia who were trying to destabilize the island26. Following the unrest and insurgencies the local French forces managed to regain control quite quickly. As a result, Azerbaijan spent huge resources and still failed to fabricate serious concerns for France. Moreover, the newly established authorities in New Caledonia immediately declared the cooperation agreements with the Speaker of Azerbaijani Parliament null and void. Development of Armenia – France military-political relations Relations between Armenia and France have historically evolved in friendly environment, which was much fostered by the bilateral historico-cultural ties, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by France, the active role of the Armenian Diaspora in France. Apart from that, for years France has been an OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair state, acting as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process. Since 1993, Armenia and France have signed a number of agreements pertaining to the cooperation development in the spheres of culture, science, technology, economy and defense27. In its turn, the "Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement" (CEPA) signed between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia contributed to the enhancement of their relations, which provided complementary options for France to expand its activities in Armenia. The development of relations has always been greatly influenced by the activities of the large Armenian community in France. In terms of the best integration in France, the case of the Armenian community in France, with its pro-state activities, can be best illustrated as exemplary for other ethnic groups. Armenian community organizations have managed to establish partnership relations with all influential political actors in French socio-political processes. The fight against radical Islam in France has also indirectly contributed to the weakening of the activities of Turkish and Azerbaijani lobbies there. In addition, unlike Turkish and Azerbaijani lobbies, Armenian interest groups have always conducted independent activities and never been directed by other forces. In 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh post-war period and after the launch of Russia – Ukraine hostilities the relations between Armenia and France progressed even better. It was attributable to the de facto cessation of France's restraining mediation in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the rise in tension in Armenian-Russian allied relations, and the "Westernization" of Armenia's defense policy. By developing military-political relations with Armenia, France is trying out to prevent attempts at “regionalization” of governance in the South Caucasus. For France, both Turkey and Russia are strategic competitors in the Middle East, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Sahel. The very existence of Armenia as a geographical obstacle to the spread of Pan-Turkism to Central Asia, the partnership relations between Armenia and Iran, as well as the role of Armenian Christian communities in the former French colonies in the Middle East are also important in terms of strengthening Armenian-French relations. Expanding defense sector strategic cooperation in the development of military-political relations between Armenia and France28, which commenced in 2022, is of great significance. In October 2023, an agreement was reached at the level of defense ministers to continue the strategic rapprochement between the states set in motion in 2022. The agreement signed between the parties states that France undertakes to support the transformation and capability development of the RA Armed Forces to be carried out in the format of retraining of military personnel and military-technical cooperation. Within the framework of military-technical aid, Armenia gains an offing of acquiring “GM-200” air defense systems, “Mistral”-type anti-aircraft missile systems, night-vision goggles, armored vehicles, etc. In the framework of the cooperation, a French military adviser has been appointed to Armenia’s Armed Forces29. In the development of relations between Armenia and France the economic factor is similarly important. In 2023, France ranked fourth in terms of foreign direct investment in Armenia ($12.1 million), which, however, is about 5% less than in 202230. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, for example, in 2019, by contrast, France was the second foreign investor in Armenia after Russia31. Compared to 2022, the volumes of bilateral trade circulation have also increased somewhat, in 2023, in particular, they totaled about $150 million. In 2023, the volume of imports from France to Armenia increased by around 50%, equaling roughly $140 million, while exports from Armenia to France remained almost unchanged, equivalent to close $10 million32. French companies play an active part in the balance of the Armenian economy, especially in the spheres of agro-based industries (“Pernod Ricard”), banking (“Credit Agricole”), and water resources management (“Véolia”). The French Development Agency, which has been operating in Armenia since 2013, also plays a leading part in the development of Armenia – France economic relations by way of contributing to the advancement of the agriculture via grants and loans, and to the increase of the efficiency of public financial management in Armenia33. Conclusion Owing to 2022 France’s Foreign Policy Strategic Review its geopolitical priorities underwent changes. France shifted from combating terrorism and extremism to a national strategy of preparing for interstate conflicts, neutralizing hybrid threats, and confronting the deepening competition among great powers. France chose to weaken its geopolitical involvement in the African – Middle Eastern regions and make efforts in significantly increasing its role in the Eastern European and Central Asian regions. France's foreign policy strategic review did have a significant impact on its growing involvement in the South Caucasus. The augmentation of Armenian-French military-political relations facilitates for Armenia to balance its foreign policy. Suchlike enhancement of relations for Armenia especially features in receiving France’s support in the modernization of the Armed Forces. In terms of bilateral relations there are serious opportunities also for boosting cooperation in the energy sector. For all that, France does not claim the role of a guarantor of Armenia's security. Moreover, France's policy regarding Azerbaijan in due parts has been achieved through the efforts of local Armenian lobbies. From regional security perspectives, it is important that the deepening of France's defense sector cooperation with Armenia is targeted not at provoking any further aggression against Azerbaijan, but rather at facilitating the introduction of peace mechanisms by ensuring military balance. This will also serve France in maintaining its economic investments in the Caspian region and increasing its geopolitical influence. Translated by Ani Martirosyan