This article uses historical methodology to analyze the differences that the 7 th Congress of the Communist International revealed between its anti-fascist discourse and the actual relations within the labor movement. This dynamic was particularly evident in Spain between August 1935, when the new communist strategy was adopted, and February 1936, when the Popular Front won the elections. The Spanish case stemmed from a specific precedent, i.e. the anti-fascist workers’ uprising in Asturias in 1934, which allowed the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) to play a significant role at the 7 th Congress of the Communist International and be part of the Popular Front’s electoral coalition. The article’s main goal is to highlight the progress that the 7 th Congress of the Communist International made and the constraints it created in the relations between the PCE and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). The Spanish communists identified the relations with PSOE as a strategic priority. However, they were unable to shake off certain distrust of the PSOE. The PCE did find common ground with the socialists and initiated the formation of a united proletarian party, yet these efforts did not bear fruit. Nonetheless, this process offers a new historiographical insight into the underlying importance of the 7 th Congress of the Communist International: it should not be seen as a Machiavellian strategy to trigger a proletarian revolution, but as an effort to overcome the political and social isolation of the communist movement. Still, this came at the expense of encroaching on the socialist territory: the communists did not renounce their long-term goal of starting a proletarian revolution, but in the short and medium term they respected the liberal democratic model as it was established.
Josep Puigsech Farràs (Wed,) studied this question.
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