Law and Freedom

In this article, the focus will first be on the distinction Spinoza makes in his Tractatus theologico-politicus on the different strivings of human beings and the two different conceptions of law—natural and ad arte—in relation to freedom. Proceeding from these distinctions and Spinoza’s objective with his philosophical enquiries, I will then consider whether a change occurs between the earlier TTP and the later unfinished Tractatus politicus. Both texts are marked by a naturalist turn, the indifference of religion, moral neutrality, the identification of right and power and the denial of natural hierarchy, but nonetheless one can also observe a change in the TP, where the naturalistic premise is more explicit, the human condition more on the forefront and the use of the concepts more precise; the ‘people’, for example, are replaced by the ‘multitude’. In search of sources and aspects for the naturalist turn and the specific conceptual evolution between the TTP and TP, we will consider the example of Machiavelli (and thereafter of Lucretius), De la Court’s notion of a free republic building on Machiavelli and the revolutionary ideas of Van den Enden aimed at improving on his predecessor. The different aspects linked to the use of the concept of multitude in the TP will then be analyzed in relation to the sources and aspects mentioned so as to return to the initial questions concerning law and freedom.