Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories

Abstract This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification , which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer .