Adam Zeman’s recent review provides a thorough exploration of mental imagery extremes and their far-reaching implications. The article contrasts the lack of subjective imagery experience found in aphantasia with the heightened vividness of hyperphantasia. This discussion is extremely important for understanding the diversity of human thought from a basic perspective and in high-level cognitive processes. To facilitate this conversation, we propose refined definitions that distinguish aspects of subjective imagery experiences from measurable cognitive performance. By addressing this concern, both in Zeman’s piece and across the broader field, we encourage a clearer understanding of mental imagery’s complexity and emphasize the need for robust, multifaceted metrics that separate the experiential dimensions of imagery from the empirical. We hope this will facilitate investigations of the neural, behavioral, and psychophysiological mechanisms underlying imagery extremes.
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Razzak et al. (2024) studied this question.
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