Response to Jessica Frazier, “Against Infinite Nothingness”

In “Against Infinite Nothingness: Arguments for Foundationalism in Indian Philosophy” Jessica Frazier brings Vedantic arguments to bear against contemporary objections to foundationalism : the view that there must exist a single self-subsistent ground upon which the existence of all else stands. She argues in particular that these arguments permit us to infer the existence of a “modal anchor” operative in nature that deserves to be regarded as fundamental, even in the absence of a “fundamental level” to nature. This paper argues that Frazier has not sufficiently justified the assertion that such modal anchors have a right to be regarded as metaphysically fundamental, even in the less demanding sense that she seemingly associates with that term. This does not mean that there is any incoherence in what Frazier is trying to argue, however. The argument given here should thus be seen as an invitation to more fully spell out the notion of fundamentality that Frazier regards as most appropriate to these ancient Vedantic texts.