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Objective: The ‘illusion of control’ is a dominant cognitive illusion in disordered gambling, but its role in shaping irrational gambling beliefs has been questioned by recent null experimental findings. Here we aimed to test this recent work, in a preregistered Bayesian framework, by additionally correlating the dependent variable (non–uniform probabilistic beliefs) with self-reported gambling behavior, and by exploring ‘passive superstition’ as an alternative driver of these irrational gambling beliefs. Method: A between-participants online experiment involving three boxes, one of which a 1 prize was randomly assigned to (N=3, 064; 49. 1% Male, 49. 5% Female, 1. 4% Other; mean age 42. 5). Participants estimated the likelihood of each box winning, with any estimates outside the 33-34% interval categorized as irrational ‘non-uniform’ probabilistic beliefs. ‘Pre-selection’ participants gave estimates prior to box selection; ‘post-no-choice’ participants had their box randomly selected, and participants in the treatment ‘post-choice’ condition selected their own box. Whether participants gambled within last 12-months (gambling status), Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) score, and passive superstition scores were used as additional predictors. Results: Comparing post–choice participants with post–no–choice participants (95% CI 0. 80, 1. 22) and comparing post-choice with pre–selection participants (95% CI 0. 88, 1. 34) yielded substantial support for a null effect. Gambling status supported substantial evidence for a null effect (95% CI 0. 92, 1. 30), whereas higher PGSI (95% CI 1. 08, 1. 13) and higher passive superstition scores (95% CI 1. 08, 1. 10) overwhelmingly predicted our outcome. Conclusions: Active choice elements in illusions of control may have been overemphasized in irrational gambling beliefs compared to passive superstitions.
Monson et al. (Fri,) studied this question.