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This analysis challenges existing views on want and desire ascriptions, highlighting decision theory's role.
Kyle Blumberg has recently argued that (i) the ideal worlds account of desire — according to which for S to want p is for all of S's top-ranked worlds to be p-worlds — has difficulties accounting for certain cases involving the ascribee's ignorance. He takes these cases to be (ii) a reason to disprefer the Kratzerian account of `want' to its rivals, and (iii) to doubt that desire ascriptions are upward entailing. I challenge all three claims. Along the way, I motivate and develop a Kratzer-style account, according to which what a subject wants depends not just on their information and preferences, but also on the decision rule they embrace and the salient decision problem.
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Tomasz Zyglewicz (2025) studied this question.
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