Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This paper uncovers the multi-user security of LightMAC and LightMAC_Plus, suggesting new security bounds for multiple instances.
LightMAC is one of the ISO/IEC standardized message authentication codes that provably achieves security roughly in the order of O(q^2/2^n), where q is the total number of queries and n is the block size of the underlying block cipher. In a subsequent work, Naito proposed a beyond-birthday-bound variant of the LightMAC construction, dubbed LightMAC_Plus, and demonstrated that it achieves 2n/3-bit PRF security. Later in EUROCRYPT'20, Kim et al. improved the security bound of LighMAC_Plus from 2n/3 bits to 3n/4 bits. However, all these security results have been proven in the single-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to a single instance of the construction. In this paper, we investigate, for the first time, the security of the LightMAC and the LightMAC_Plus constructions in the context of the multi-user setting, where we assume that the adversary has access to more than one instance of the construction. In particular, we have shown that LightMAC offers O(qq_maxl k/2^n + up/2^k) multi-user PRF security, where q denotes the total number of construction queries, p denotes the total number of offline primitive queries, q_max denotes the maximum number of queries per user, u denotes the total number of users and l denotes the maximum number of message blocks in a query. We have also shown that LightMAC_Plus maintains security up to approximately 2^2n/3 construction queries and 2^2k/3 ideal-cipher queries in the ideal-cipher model, where n denotes the block size and k denotes the key size of the block cipher.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Datta et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: