Matching Students to Pre-primary Schools in India

This essay explores in depth the complexities of India's primary school selection system, with a particular focus on the application of matching market design principles, including delayed acceptance (DA) algorithms. The main aim of the study was to examine how these basic concepts might address common problems associated with the allocation of school seats to families, ensuring that the system is both inclusive and viable. Through this analysis, GGAL will create a mechanism that promotes equity and benefits all relevant stakeholders. The study, which extends to examining the potential impact of changing the current selection process, hypothesizes that the integration of DA algorithms could provide a comprehensive solution to the primary school enrolment needs of families across India, promoting a more equitable and efficient allocation of educational resources. By forecasting the potential outcomes and examining various case studies where similar algorithms have been implemented, the essay seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion about educational equity and accessibility in the Indian context.