In this paper I examine Socrates’ argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified by the sight-lovers with sensible things. Also in this paper I suggest an alternative interpretation of the so-called ‘Two Worlds Theory’ which is based on the distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion.
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Thanassis Gkatzaras (2024) studied this question.
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