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Traditionally, the employer who bears the obligation to comply with the labor union's request for collective bargaining is in a "certain legal relationship" with the workers-that is, a labor contract relationship. The position of precedents is also the same as the foregoing. However, a recent lower court ruling (hereinafter referred to as "the target ruling") recognizes the original contractor's obligation to comply with the subcontractor's labor union's request for collective bargaining based on "substantial and concrete control and the right to decide" rather than "a certain legal relationship." This judgment raises strong doubts.BR Workers' collective bargaining (rights) should be understood from the perspective of the legal act of concluding a collective agreement rather than a simple factual act. Collective bargaining can be defined as a "private act that contains elements of legal acts between labor and management." Therefore, to recognize the original contractor's obligation to comply with the subcontractor's labor union's request, a basis for the occurrence of the obligation is necessary. The most representative basis is the "labor contract," and the original contractor's obligation to comply may also be recognized due to "a cause that can be identified with it." Therefore, a "relative legal relationship based on a special combination" can be formed between the subcontractor's labor union and the original contractor, justifying the original contractor's obligation to comply. In short, the target ruling presents "substantial and concrete control and the right to decide" as the cause of the formation of the relative legal relationship resulting from such a special combination.BR However, the fact that the target ruling recognizes the original contractor's substantial and concrete control over the subcontractor's workers and the right to decide on their request is a result that runs completely counter to the grounds for argument that led to the "factual grounds recognized" by the target ruling and the conclusion. This is because the target ruling presupposes a distributor's shop consignment contract relationship between the original contractor and the subcontractor (i.e., a true subcontracting contract relationship) while actually recognizing the original contractor's substantial and concrete control over and right to make decisions on the working conditions directly linked to the provision of labor by the subcontractor's workers. If a relative legal relationship based on a special combination between the original contractor and the subcontractor's workers can be recognized based on the substantial and concrete control and right to decide (regardless of its name), it must be explained how the "original contractor's actual influence on his business (place) (based on his property rights)," "rights to command in the dominant-subordinate relationship," and "substantial and concrete control and right to decide" can be conceptually distinguished and via which different component markers. However, the target ruling is silent on the foregoing, and it is hard to find a view that presents the contents of the component markers of such substantial and concrete control and the right to decide.BR In conclusion, the concept of substantial and concrete control and the right to decide is just a "rhetorical expression" without substance because it cannot be said to be a "certain cause that can be identified with a contract" that can form a relative legal relationship based on a special combination between the subcontractor's workers and the original contractor.
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Kim et al. (2024) studied this question.
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