¿Cómo delibera y decide un estoico? How Does a Stoic Deliberate and Decide?

This article explores, from an epistemic perspective, the scope of some key notions of the Stoic theory of action at the moment of a rational agent’s deliberation. It is argued that deliberation consists primarily in a critical examination of impulsive presentations (φαντασίαι ὁρμητικαί) and that indifferent objects (ἀδιάφορα), as carriers of a kind of selective value (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική), rather than a reason to act constitute a reason to believe (Klein, 2015). Finally, it is concluded that virtue, contrary to what has sometimes been interpreted, is not part of the deliberative process as one among other considerations about the indifferent because the moral value of virtue is incommensurable with the natural value of the indifferent. However, virtue enters decisively into deliberation insofar as the practical end of the rational agent is to reason perfectly (εὐλογιστεῖν) in full consonance with the demands of destiny.