The Russian war on Ukraine constitutes an attack on a sovereign country in clear violation of international law -- a bad omen for autocratic challenges to the liberal, rule-based order promoted by Western democracies. Are Western democracies ready for this challenge? Their governments attempt to commit themselves to assist Ukraine for `as long as it takes'. We argue that the credibility of such announcements and the ability of Western governments to provide long-term economic and military support depends on the extent of resolve of their respective electorates. Building on the literature on support for war, we are the first to study citizens' multidimensional assessments of the conditions and risks of supporting Ukraine. With support for Ukraine being increasingly politicized within the US and European countries, how reliable is the backing of Ukraine among the mass public of the top 5 supporters (US, UK, Germany, Italy, and France)? Drawing on conjoint and vignette survey experiments (N=10,000), we provide comparative evidence for populations split on this issue. On average, the full self-determination of Ukraine prevails in citizens' assessments but is not unconditional: strategic risks and the human, but not economic, costs of war are relevant constraints. However, around a quarter of the population does not care about outcomes for Ukraine -- while another quarter shows unconditional support. These results indicate limits to strong resolve against autocratic challenges inherent to the set-up of decision-making in liberal democracies, informing current policy debates.
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Rudolph et al. (2024) studied this question.
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