Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Theoretical analysis reveals that precise public disclosure increases bank risk taking, suggesting maximum stability is reached in opaque financial environments.
Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Moreno et al. (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: